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NOTE AND COMMENT
CHALLENGESr]o T E ARaRY.-Trial by jury demands impartial jurors as
the indispensable basis for public confidence. And the first requisite for
obtaining impartiality is indifference on the part of those who select the
jury. This was fully recognized at the common law, and ever since the
days when jurors ceased to be witnesses and became triers of facts, it was
a good objection to the entire panel that the sheriff was not indifferent
'between the parties in the selection and summoning of the jury. Prejudice
on the part of individual jurors could be met by challenges to the polls,
but when favor lurked behind the juror in the officer who selected and
.summoned him, insidiously cutting at the very root of the jury as an impartial tribunal, the whole panel was infected with a fatal infirmity.
The remedy of a challenge to the array has always been reserved for
-those serious offenses against fairness which affect the integrity of the jury
itself. In Comnmonwealth v. Walsk (1878), 124 Mass. 32, 35, Chief Justice
Gray said: -"A challenge to the array * * * appears, at common law, to
have been allowed only on account of the partiality or default of the sheriff
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or other officer who made the return. All the cases referred to by counsel
were of that character. If the sheriff returned a juror on the nomination
of one of the parties, or knowingly returned a person more favorable to
one party than to the other, it showed partiality, or, as it was called, unindifferency, on the part of the sheriff, which was a ground for challenging
the array." just what was meant by the term "defauie' as distinguished
from "partiality" is somewhat obscure, for while all the common law cases
use both words in the alternative, they do not attempt a differentiation. But
it seems probable that the default referred to was primarily some departure
from proper legal method tending to produce that partiality which such a
challenge was designed to prevent, so that the two grounds are really one,-prejudicial bias, actual or possible, in the selection of the jury. This is the
effect of the various opinions in the great English case of O'Connell v.
The Queen (1844), ii Cl. & Vin. 155, where the House of Lords gave the
subject a most thorough examination. In that case it was admitted that
jury
59 out of some 7oo names which should have appeared on the general
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ted, and while the majority of the Lords held that no challenge to the array
would lie because that remedy was confined to the acts of the sheriff himself, yet Lords Denman, Campbell, and Coleridge vigorously contended that
when any of the ancient duties of the sheriff were by statute given to other
officers, the ancient remedy should be deemed to apply to the statutory successors of the sheriff. If that were true, they argued, the challenge to the
array ought to have been sustained, not because there were names omitted
but because they were fraudilently omitted. This application of the remedy
to all officers engaged in selecting and summoning the jury has the general
approval of modern courts. People z. Harding (1884), 53 Mich. 48.
The new statute creating the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit
has been the occasion for bringing up the subject of challenges to the array
in two recent cases---People v. MfcNutt (igez), 2o Mich. 62o, and People
v. Cathey (z192), =uo Mich. 628. A special board of jury commissioners
was created to provide juries for that court and the constitutionality of the
statute was sought to be questioned by a challenge to the array of jurors
prepared by that board. A majority of the court held that the question
could not be so raised because the commissioners were de facto officers acting under color of office, and their authority could not be collaterally
attacked. Many modem cases are cited applying this principle to juries
empanelled by de facto officers. Cases might have been added showing that
such has been the rule of the common law for several centuries: Hoare v.
Broom (595), Croke's Eliz. 369, where the sheriff returned an array after
he had received a writ of discharge from office, and Anonymous (i689), 2
Vent. 58, where the return was made by a sheriff who had never taken the
oath of office.
The result here reached depends upon the doctrine that there can be a
de facto officer without a de jure office, for the objection to the jury commission of the Recojder's Court went to the validity of the office itself.
In Michigan the principle has been recently approved, upon very careful
consideration, that a de ivre office is not necessary in order to have a de
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facto officer.

Gildemneister v. Lindsay ([92o), 212 Mich. 299. In other
states there is an irreconcilable conflict. In accord with the Michigan view
are State v. Poulin (ipop), 1o!; Me. 229; State v. Gardner (iS96), 54 Ohio
St. 24; State v. Bailey (19o8), zo6 Minn. 138; State V. Carroll (1871), 38
Conn. 449; Lang v. Bayonne (igo6), 74 Nl. J. L. 455 To the contrary are
Ifing Lumber Co. v. Crow (19o8), x55 Ala. 5o4; Norton v. Shelby County
(1886), u8 'U. S. 425; Buck v. Eureka (1895), iog Cal. 504; In re Norton.
(z9oa), 64 Ian. 842; Herrington v. State (1898), 1O3 Ga. 318; Matter of
Quinn. (1897), z52 N. Y. 89; State v. O'Brien (1878), 68 Mo. 153.
But even though the doctrine of a de facto officer could not be resorted
to in support of a jury panel selected by an unconstitutional commission,
the use of the challenge to the array to bring up a technical objection of
this kind might well be questioned as contrary to the common law purpose
of that remedy. That purpose was to prevent a trial by a packed jury.
American cases where such challenges have been sustained on common law
'
grounds are almost entirely cases of "unindifference on the part of those
drawing and summoning juries. State v. Powers (1896), 136 Mo. 194
(sheriff was prosecuting witness and selected jurors in his own favor);
Vaiauken v. Beemer (1817), 4 N. J. L. 364 (constable was related to plaintiff); Woods v. Rowan (18o9), 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 133 (sheriff as plaintiff
summoned the jury) ; Muinshower v. Patton (x823), 1o Serg. & Rawle (Pa.)
334 (sheriff was a brother of defendant) ; Vermont Box Co. v. Hanks (Vt.,
1917), io2 Atl. 91 (defendant participated with the sheriff in-drawing the
jury panel). In Conkey v. Northern Bank (1857), 6 Wis. 447, the challenge
was overruled on the ground that no partiality of the sheriff was shown;
and in Ullman v. State (i9os), 24 Wis. 6o2, departures from the statute
as to method of empanelling were held not grounds for challenge to the
array when they did not tend to prejudice the complaining party. In People
v. MacGregor (I914), 178 Mich. 436, where in many townships the number
of jurors returned was short, in many others the number returned was
excessive, one township made no return, several made improperly executed
returns, and in' only a small minority of the townships was the statute followed, the challenge to the array was, nevertheless, held properly overruled.
So in Niles v. Circuit Judge (1894), 1o2 Mich. 328, where the assessment
rolls for 1892 were used instead of those for 1893, this was held to be no
ground for challenge to the array where it appeared that a majority of the
jurors actually summoned were eligible. Such a case as Gladden v. State
(i86p), 13 Fla. 623, holding that the slightest departure from the statutory
method of empanelling the jury was ground for a challenge to the array,
is a subject of almost universal criticism. See THompsox & MERmRAm or
Jums, § 47, note.
The inappropriateness of a challenge to the array for any purpose other
than maintaining the purity of the jury as an impartial tribunal of justice
is specifically recognized by the statutes of many states. Thus only "material departures" from the forms prescribed by statute are authorized grounds
for such a challenge, Buford & Co. v. McGetshie (1882), 6o Ia. 2098; and
other statutes add the further requirement, as an additional precaution, that
it must be such as to prejudice the party. People v. Burgess (1897), 153
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N. Y. s61; Wadswortlh v. State (XMi3), 9 Okia. Cr. 84. A material departure
is held to be such as to deprive a party of the opportunity to secure an
impartial jury. People v. Davis (1887), 73 Cal. 355; People V. Sowell
(x9o4),

145 Cal. :92. In Texas such a challenge can never be used except

where the officer summoning the jury has corruptly summoned persons
known to be prejudiced against the party. Forrester v. State (I914), 73
Tex. Cr. 61.
A challenge to the array on technical grounds not affecting in any way
the quality of the jury as an impartial trier of facts, is entitled to little consideration at the hands of the courts. It is merely an impediment thrown
in the path of justice. As was said by Judge Davis in Thompson v. People
(C875), 6 Hun (N. Y.) i39, when the disqualification of the jury commissioner was urged on a challenge to the array. "There was, of course,
nothing meritorious in the challenge, because it could not make the slightest
difference to the prisoners whether the panel of jurors by whom they were
about to be tried was selected from lists prepared by one or the other of
the persons named. The qualifications of the jurors could neither be
increased nor diminished by the officer who selected them, and no injury, in
fact, could accrue to the prisoners whether the commissioner was one acting both de facto and de jure, or only de facto; and courts would not be justified, in any case, in arresting a trial for the purpose of settling a question so
wholly immaterial in any valuable consequence to the accused." E. R. S.
CONSTITUTIONAx, LAW-POLIcs POWER, REGULATION, AND CONFISCATION.
-- 'Whether the power be taken away directly, or be deadened and atrophied in its action by adverse criticism and demagogic clamor, when the
judiciary no longer feel at liberty to construe the provisions of the fundamental law 'in the light of reason,' constitutional government, in the sense
in which it has been understood for a century and a half, will be at an
end, and the doctrine of the police power will have been swallowed up in
the capacious maw of unrestrained democracy." 27 HARv. L. RXv. 316. Mr.
W.ickersham penned this warning during the period when the swell of socialized state legislation, under the cloak of the police power, met the ready
approval of the United States Supreme Court. Those vested interests,
whose rights were encroached upon, probably felt that the police power was
all that the spleen of Dr. Johnson expressed toward patriotism. Indeed,
the views found in some of the opinions may have seemed to justify apprehension of actual confiscation under that indefinite power. See, in particular, Noble State Batik v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 110, II, and the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Lochner v. New York, t98 U. S. 45, 76.
Where the line would be drawn between the regulation of property rights
and the taking thereof remained in doubt. In a recent decision the Supreme
Court appears to have "pricked out" a point beyond which the power to
regulate cannot go.
This case involved the constitutionality of the Kohler Act (1921), P.
L. ix98, by which the Pennsylvania legislature made it unlawful to mine
anthracite coal in such a way as to cause a subsidence of any public building
or structure, street, road, bridge, or other passage way, and among other

